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L Introduction
When Metropolitan Educational Enterprises (Metropolitan) denied
Darlene Walters a promotion at work, she believed that she had a compelling
Title VII claim for gender discrimination against her employer. ' She might
have, but we will never know. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit refused to hear her complaint. 2 Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (the 1964 Act), parties may bring suit only against
employers who employ at least fifteen employees.' Ms. Walters, her lawyer,
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) each counted
the number of employees on Metropolitan's payroll, 4 and each counted more
than fifteen.' Several courts have endorsed the method of counting all employees on an employer's payroll.' The Seventh Circuit explained, however,
that counting employees was not that simple.7 The Seventh Circuit counted
all salaried employees toward the required fifteen, but considered hourly or
part-time workers to be employees only on the days when they were physically present at work or on paid leave. 8 As a result, the court of appeals
refused to count Metropolitan's part-time workers and thus counted fewer
than fifteen employees. 9 With this decision, the Seventh Circuit perpetuated
a split of authority among the United States Courts of Appeals over whether
to count part-time workers for purposes of Title VII jurisdiction. 10

1. See EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 60 F.3d 1225, 1226 (7th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that part-time employees do not count toward requisite minimum number of
employees for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996). For further discussion of the Metropolitan case, see infra
notes 164-204 and accompanying text.
2. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1226.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (defining "employer" for purposes of Title VIi). For
Title VII's definition of employer and a discussion of the text of the statute, see infra notes
27-33 and accompanying text.
4. EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 864 F. Supp. 71, 72 (N.D. II1. 1994) (stating
facts of case from district court record), aft'd, 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
5. Id.
6. See infra part Hii.A (discussing and analyzing payroll method of counting employees
for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VI).
7. See EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 60 F.3d 1225, 1227-30 (7th Cir. 1995)
(analyzing and criticizing plaintiff's approach to counting employees and concluding that courts
should count only employees at work or on paid leave), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
8. Id.at 1227.
9. Id.
10. See infra part II (discussing circuit courts of appeals split over whether to count
part-time employees for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VI).
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The question of whether to count part-time employees for purposes of
Title VII jurisdiction poses social and legal consequences for a sizable portion of the American work force." There are many potential plaintiffs like
Darlene Walters. As of 1992, over twenty-five million employees worked
for establishments that employed twenty or fewer workers. ' 2 Furthermore,
approximately five and one-half million establishments employed less than
twenty workers.' 3 A recent study showed that in 1992 over nine million
people worked on a part-time basis in the United States. 4 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit's approach to counting employees excludes thousands of potential
plaintiffs. The Supreme Court will resolve the issue of whether to count
part-time employees when the Court hears Ms. Walters's appeal from the
Seventh Circuit.' 5
This Note explores the split among the courts of appeals over whether
to count part-time employees for purposes of Title VII jurisdiction. Part II
explains the relevant text of the 1964 Act 6 and analyzes the legislative
history of the 1964 Act from its initial passage through an important 1972
amendment. 7 Part II concludes that the legislative history of the 1964 Act,
although vague, suggests that Congress intended for federal courts to construe Title VII broadly.' 8 Part III discusses the split in the courts of appeals
11. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (providing statistics showing that large
number of small businesses and part-time employees exist).
12. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1995, at 500 (1995) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1995]. The Bureau of the Census
did not count 1992 government and railroad employees. Id. The Census Bureau defined
"establishment" as "a single physical location where business is conducted or where services
or industrial operations are performed." Id. As of mid-March 1992, a total of 3,442,894
employees worked for establishments employing between one and four employees; 1,280,504

employees worked for establishments employing between five and nine employees; and
783,183 employees worked for establishments employing between ten and nineteen employees.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS ANNUAL
1991 & 1992 (1994).
13. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1995, supra note 12, at 550.
14. Id. at 408. For 1994, the Bureau counted 9,473,000 people who worked 34 hours
or less (for a civilian population of 16 years of age or older). Id.
15. See Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996) (granting
certiorari to plaintiff's appeal from EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 60 F.3d 1225 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
16. See infra part I.A (discussing and analyzing statutory language of Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
17. See infra part II.B-C (analyzing legislative history of Title VII and concluding that
legislative history lends little assistance to answering question of whether to count part-time
employees for Title VII jurisdiction).
18. See infra part II.B (suggesting Congress intended broad construction of Title VII).
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over the appropriate method for counting employees. 19 In addition, Part III
considers the EEOC's position in favor of the payroll method of counting
employees. 2 Finally, Part IV advances two arguments: First, Congress,
rather than the Supreme Court, should resolve the circuit split over whether
to count part-time employees. 2 Second, in light of its recent decision to
resolve this issue, the Supreme Court should adopt the payroll method and
hold that courts must count part-time employees for purposes of Title VII
jurisdiction. I
IL The Civil Rights Act of 1964
A. The Relevant Text of the 1964 Act
The 1964 Act addresses a multitude of discriminatory practices.'
Under Title VII of the 1964 Act, employers may not hire, discharge, compensate, or classify individuals based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 4 Given certain conditions, the EEOC, the Attorney General

of the United States, or an aggrieved person may file a civil action against
an employer for discriminatory practices in violation of the 1964 Act.'

To

19. See infra part III (discussing and analyzing two methods developed by courts of
appeals for counting employees for Title VII jurisdiction).
20. See infra part III.A.3 (discussing and analyzing EEOC's position on whether to
count part-time employees for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII).
21. See infra part IV.A (arguing that Congress must resolve circuit split because it is
more capable and is free to choose modem public policy for language of statutory amendment).
22. See infra part IV.B (arguing that Supreme Court should choose payroll method).
23. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-2000 (1994) (establishing laws against discrimination in areas of voting, public accommodations, public facilities, public education,
federally assisted programs, and employment).
24. See id. § 2000e-2(a). Section 2000e-2(a) reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. Section 2000e-2 also regulates employment agency practices, labor organization practices, and training programs. See id. § 2000e-2(b)-(d) (prohibiting discriminatory practices
by employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs).
25. See id. § 2000e-5(f) (granting powers to EEOC, Attorney General, and aggrieved
person to sue or to intervene in lawsuits against employers for employment discrimination).

TITLE VII JURISDICTION
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meet the 1964 Act's jurisdictional requirements, however, the employer must
fall within the Act's definition of "employer. '"I.

For purposes of the 1964 Act, an employer is a "person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year. "I The 1964 Act explains many of the definition's
components. For example, the definition of "person" is very broad.' The
term "employees" generally encompasses all individuals employed by an
employer.2 9 Although the 1964 Act does not define "current calendar year,"
case authority has interpreted the phrase to mean the year in which the
alleged discrimination occurred."
26. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(3); see also Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc. 454 F.2d 199, 200
(6th Cir. 1972) (finding requirement of 25 or more employees to be requirement for
jurisdiction under Title VII).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). The term "employer," however, does not include:
(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the
United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of
Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined
in § 2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a
labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title
26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer
than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.
Id.
28. See id. § 2000e(a) (defining "person"). The term person includes "one or more
individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions,
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock
companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11,
or receivers." Id.
29. See id. § 2000e(f) (defining "employees"). Under Title VII, the term employee
does not include:
[Any person elected to public office in any State by the qualified voters thereof,
or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set
forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil
service laws of a State government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an
individual who is a citizen of the United States.
Id.
30. See Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 979 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980)
(interpreting "current year" to refer to year in which alleged discrimination took place
(citing BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAW 837
(1976))); Utley v. Marks, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 634, 635 (S.D. Ga. 1972) (stating
that plaintiff has burden to show that employer had requisite number of employees when
alleged discrimination took place and not when plaintiff filed complaint).
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The 1964 Act, however, does not explain the phrase "for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks." This phrase's ambiguity
has generated the current inter-circuit debate over whether to count parttime employees towards the jurisdictional requirements of the 1964 Act.
Some courts have interpreted the language "for each working day" to mean
every day of a given work week."
Other courts have stated that the
phrase's ambiguity requires an interpretation of legislative intent and a consideration of the EEOC's interpretation of the phrase." After considering
the statute's legislative history and the EEOC's interpretation, those courts
have concluded that all employees on an employer's payroll should be
counted towards the jurisdictional minimum of fifteen. 3
B. The Legislative History of Title VII's Coverage at the
Time of the 1964Act 11
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy asked Congress to deliver to the
nation a comprehensive civil rights bill35 that would guarantee Americans
the opportunity for equal employment. 3 6 Congress did not answer with
legislation during President Kennedy's lifetime.3 ' After Kennedy's death,
3 1. See infra part DI.B (analyzing decisions that take Zimmerman approach to counting

employees for purposes of Title VII).
32. See infra part mII.A.1-2 (analyzing decisions that apply payroll method to counting
employees for purposes of Title VII).
33. See infra part III.A.1-2 (discussing cases that count all employees on employer's
payroll for purposes of Title VII).
34. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391 (providing legislative history of 1964 Act from House Judiciary Committee's perspective). See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE
(1985) (tracing 1964 Act's legislative history from Congress's initial investigation of civil
rights problems through statute's enactment).
35. See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL
RIGHTS 1056-61 (1970) (providing historical account of civil rights in United States). In his
June 19, 1963 Special Message to Congress, President Kennedy discussed the need to ensure
equal accommodations in public facilities, to desegregate schools, to guarantee fair and full
employment, and to deny federal aid to programs or activities that discriminate. Id.
36. Id. at 1059-60. The President stated that:
The problem of unequal job opportunity must not be allowed to grow, as the
result of either recession or discrimination. I enlist every employer, every labor
union, and every agency of government - whether affected directly by these
measures or not - in the task of seeing to it that no false lines are drawn in
assuring equality of the right and opportunity to make a decent living.
Id. at 1060.
37. Id. at 1017 (stating that first session of 88th Congress did not pass any civil rights
legislation).
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President Lyndon B. Johnson asked Congress once again to enact a civil

rights bill.3

This time Congress responded with the eleven titles of the

1964 Act.39 Congress explicitly stated its general intent for passing Title
VII: "[T]o eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal reme-

dial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin. "I
Repeated attempts by the Senate to amend Title VII illuminate other
congressional intentions with regard to the statute's meaning. The House

of Representatives passed House Bill 7152, which contained a version of
Title VII that covered employers "who employed twenty-five or more

employees. 1141 The bill then went to the Senate, where members attempted

to amend the jurisdictional language of Title VII on two occasions .42 First,

Senator Dirksen led a successful effort to amend House Bill 7152's definition of employer by adding the following language to the end of the House

definition: "[F]or each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in a current or preceding calendar year."43 An analysis of this amendment's
passage demonstrates that Congress sought to qualify the dictionary meaning of employer and also that Congress intended for the language of the
Dirksen amendment to apply to seasonal workers.'
In a discussion with Senator Clark before the amendment's passage,
Senator Dirksen noted the ambiguity of the House definition of employer
and compared the House definition to an Illinois employment practice
statute.4' Senator Clark stated that the House intended that the definition
38. Id. at 1018 (discussing President Johnson's call for civil rights legislation).
39. Id.
40. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401.
41. See 110 CONG. REc. 7216 (1964) (discussing text of H.R. 7152 when it arrived
in Senate).
42. See infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing debates
surrounding Dirksen and Cotton amendments to H.R. 7152).
43. See 110 CONG. REc. 16,001 (1964) (comparing Senate and House bills after final
passage of 1964 Act).
44. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (discussing Dirksen amendment to
H.R. 7152).
45. See 110 CONG. REc. 7215-18 (1964) (noting dialogue between Senator Dirksen
and Senator Clark over Title VII's definition of employer). Senator Dirksen posed the following questions to Senator Clark, a floor manager of the bill:
Question. Who is an employer within the meaning of [T]itle VII? I am not
sure, the bill is indefinite, we have no committee hearings, no report. Can an
employer readily ascertain from the language of the bill whether or not he is
included? Employers with a large number of employees will have no difficulty,
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of employer retain the common dictionary meaning of employer except as

qualified by the statute. 6 Senator Clark made this statement, however,
after the House passed its version of the bill.47 Senator Clark's statement,

therefore, is of limited value in understanding any change in the definition
of House Bill 7152 that might have been made by the Dirksen amendment.

Moreover, Senator Clark stated that the dictionary meaning of employer
was subject to House qualifications of that definition, namely, that an

employer had twenty-five or more employees. 4"

Therefore, Dirksen's

amendment provides additional qualifying language to a term that otherwise

might retain its dictionary meaning.
The term "employer" might, in many instances, be given its common
dictionary meaning. In those situations addressed by the Dirksen amendment, however - specifically, seasonal employees and perhaps part-time
employees generally - that common dictionary meaning was modified or

altered by the prerequisite that an employer maintain a certain number of
employees "for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year." Indeed, after the amendment
passed, Senator Dirksen stated that he added the language to protect businesses employing seasonal workers from coverage under Title VII.49
but what of the small businessman?
Answer. The term "employer" is intended to have its common dictionary
meaning, except as expressly qualified by the [A]ct.
Question. Most statutes in defining an employer in relation to the number
of employees he has are rather specific. Contrast the language on page 28 of this
bill: "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees" with the language from the Illinois FEP
Act: "(d) 'Employer' includes and means all persons, including any labor organization, labor unions, or labor association employing more than 100 persons
within the [s]tate within each of 20 or more calendar weeks, within either the
current or proceeding calendar year prior to January 1, 1963[.]" [A]ssume if you
will the operation of a medium-size orchard. For 111h months of the year the
employer has no employees. But during 2 weeks of the year he employs 100
pickers. Is he to be subjected to the provisions of this title? What of summer
or winter resort operations where employment is only for 2 or 3 months at the
most. Are they to be covered by this itle? Certainly we have no clear statement
by which an employer can be guided. Is this the way to legislate?
Answer. Employers whose staffs fluctuate seasonally are covered by the
[A]ct at times when the number of employees exceeds the minimum figure; they
are not covered when it is below the minimum.
Id.at 7216-17.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See 110 CONG. REc. 13,087 (1964) (noting Senator Dirksen's remarks regarding
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Neither Dirksen, Clark, nor any other member of the Senate, however, said

anything directly about the larger universe of part-time employees, of which
seasonal employees are but a subset. In fact, Senator Clark's and Senator
Dirksen's statements were the only statements recorded that discussed the
meaning of the statutory language of Title VII's jurisdiction." Nevertheless, their statements most likely represented the sentiments of a majority

of the members of Congress. Not only did Congress pass the Dirksen
amendment, but Senator Dirksen organized and controlled the changes and
the passage of Title VII.11 Dirksen's views represent the views that ultimately became law. After the Senate returned the amended version of

House Bill 7152, the House passed the bill with little discussion.52 Al-

his amendment to Title VII's jurisdictional language). Senator Dirksen stated:
Accordingly, the House bill was modified in some particulars. In the first place,
we undertook to provide for seasonal workers, by taking the language out of the
Unemployment Compensation Act, to the effect that the definition of the term
"employer" would apply to [employers with] 25 or more [employees] who were
employees for each working day, in each of 20 or more calendar weeks, in the
current or preceding calendar year. We went through that matter with the
Department of Labor and others, in order to make sure that we were on good
ground.
Id.
50. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 3001 (1968) (discussing procedural history of H.R. 7152). The EEOC
stated that:
An important part of the legislative history of any statute is the congressional debate that preceded its adoption. Through a combination of extraordinary
circumstances, however, the congressional debate that preceded the adoption of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and particularly the Title VII equal employment
opportunity provisions, assumed an almost overriding importance.
The Title VII provisions that were adopted by the House and that were the
subject of extensive discussion in the report of the House Judiciary Committee
were modified substantially in the substitute measure adopted in the Senate. The
substitute bill did not go through the usual committee procedure. Instead, it was
hamunered out in informal bipartisan conferences, with Majority Leader Mansfield (D., Mont.), Minority Leader Dirksen (R., Dl.), and Senators Humphrey
(D., Minn.) and Kuchel (R., Calif.) as the principals.
As a result, there was no committee report on the Senate bill. Moreover,
since the House then voted to accept the Senate bill without change, there was
no Senate-House conference report.
Id.
51. Id. (describing Dirksen's key role in amending and passing Title VII in Senate).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2431-32 (criticizing majority's procedural handling of House Bill
7752). The minority report provided the following perspective on the House discussion of
the amended House Bill 7152 immediately before members voted:

53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1103 (1996)
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though this haste may have been the product of political manipulation, the
majority of the House members quickly acquiesced to the Senate's changes

in Title VII's coverage.

3

The second occasion on which the Senate attempted to amend the
jurisdictional language of Title VII was Senator Cotton's proposal to limit
Title VII's coverage to employers with one hundred or more employees.'
The Senators in favor of the Cotton amendment stated that the twenty-five
employee threshold was too low. They argued that the twenty-five employee limit invaded the intimate social milieu of small businesses,' preThe bill was, upon order of the chairman, read hastily by the clerk, without
pause or opportunity for amendment. Several members of the committee repeatedly
requested to be permitted to ask questions, have an explanation of the bill, discuss
it, consider its provisions, and offer amendments. The Chair refused to grant such
requests or to recognize these members of the committee for any purpose. After
the reading of the bill in the fashion hereinabove described, the chairman announced
that he would allow himself 1 minute to discuss the bill, after which he would
recognize for 1 minute the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Ohio.
This was an ostensible attempt to comply, technically, with the rules of the House
but did not amount to debate, as debate is generally understood. Neither of these
gentlemen discussed the bill for more than 1 minute; both of them refused to yield
to any other member of the committee; and neither of them debated the bill nor
discussed it in any fashion other than to say that they favored it. They made no
effort in the 2 minutes consumed by both together to even so much as explain the
provisions of the bill. In short, there was no actual debate or even any opportunity
for debate.
Id.
53. Id.
54. See 110 CONG. REc. 13,088 (1964) (noting congressional debate concerning
Senator Cotton's amendment to change Title VlH's coverage to businesses with 100 employees or more).
55. Id. at 13,085 (consisting of Senator Cotton's remarks in favor of his amendment
to limit Title VII's coverage). Senator Cotton stated:
[T]he principal reason why [T]itle VII is so repugnant, at least to me, lies in the
fact that in a small business which employs 30 or 40 persons, the personal relationship is predominant. I can understand how the [flederal [g]overnment could
operate in connection with large factories and industries and in dealing with their
employment practices, and in seeking, whenever it finds it necessary to do so, to
enforce these provisions - although I think there are even objections to that. But
when a small businessman who employs 30 or 25 or 26 persons selects an employee, he comes very close to selecting a partner; and when a businessman selects a
partner, he comes dangerously close to the situation he faces when he selects a wife.
A small business - for example, an insurance agency or a real estate business or
a small manufacturing business with only a few employees - stands or falls, in this
age of competition, on the congeniality and skill and ability of the man or the partners who own it and the persons who work for them and work with them.
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vented small minority employers from hiring exclusively minority work
forces, 6 and created legal liability that threatened the financial viability of
small family businessesY The Senators who opposed the Cotton amendment argued that the amendment's coverage unfairly discriminated between
large and small employers58 and would eliminate coverage of a significant
portion of the labor force.59 With a vote of 63 to 34 against the Cotton
amendment, the Senate affirmed its intention to extend Title VII's coverage
56. Id. at 13,086. Senator Cotton stated:
I would assume that anyone who will administer the laws in future years will
not discriminate between the races. If I were [an African-American], and by dint
of education, training, and hard work, I had amassed enough property as [an
African-American] so that I had a business of my own - and there are many of
them in this country - and I felt that, having made a success of it myself, I wanted
to help people of my own race to step up as I had stepped up, I think I should have
the right to do so. I think I should have the right to employ [African-Americans]
in my own establishment and put out a helping hand to them if I so desired. I do
not believe that anyone in Washington should be permitted to come in and say,
"You cannot employ all [African-Americans]. You must have some Poles. You
must have some Yankees." The latter would not be available down South to any
extent, but there are other places that would be affected.
Id.
57. Id. at 13,092. Senator Cotton told the story of an employer who lost a case before
an examiner. Id. The examiner recommended that the employer's former employee be
reinstated and paid his back wages under the Wagner Act. Id. The Senator advised the
employer to appeal the examiner's ruling. Id. The employer decided against such action,
despite the employee's drunk and disorderly behavior on the job and lack of safety concern
for his fellow employees. Id. The employer replied, "I cannot afford to do that. I will pay
this fellow's back wages, and will re-employ him; that will be the cheapest way for me out
of the situation." Id.
58. Id. at 13,089. Senator Morse argued that employer size should not be a license
to discriminate:
To me, the issue is very simple. It is whether or not we will permit, in this
democracy, discrimination against people because of the color of their skin. That
is a moral issue as well as a great legal issue. I am at a loss to understand how it
can be immoral to have an employer of 100 or more employees denied the exercise
of discrimination and have it granted to an employer of fewer than 100 employees.
I do not intend to take my eyes off the basic issue, and that is the immorality
of discrimination based upon race or the color of one's skin.
It is just as wrong for an employer who employs two people to have that right
to discriminate as the basis of his employment as it is for an employer of 2,000
employees to have it.
Id. Senator Morse also argued that small businesses should not have a license to discriminate. Id. at 13,092.
59. Id. at 13,087. Senator Dirksen stated: "Now if we undertake to make the cutoff
100 employees or more, I am afraid we shall really be subject to the charge that we are
undertaking to emasculate the bill." Id.

1114

53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1103 (1996)

to employers with a minimum of 25 employees.'° The defeat of the Cotton
amendment illustrates the fact that, although Congress intended for Title
VII's coverage to be limited in order to protect small businesses, Congress
also intended for Title VII to be a remedial measure that covered a significant portion of the labor force.

C. The Legislative History of Title VI's Coverage at the Time of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972

Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (the
1972 Act) to broaden Title VII's jurisdictional coverage. 6' The 1972 Act
60. Id. at 13,093 (noting Senate's final vote on Cotton amendment).
61. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D
CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT
OF 1972, at 80 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter LABOR SUBcoMMITTEE'S REPORT].
Senator Hawkins, from the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, stated the following
purpose of the 1972 Act:
The committee feels that discrimination in employment is contrary to the national
policy and equally invidious whether practiced by small or large employers.
Because of the existing limitation in the bill proscribing the coverage of Title VII
to 25 or more employees or members, a large segment of the Nation's work
force is excluded from an effective Federal remedy to redress employment discrimination. For the reasons already stated in earlier sections of this report, the
committee feels that the Commission's remedial power should also be available
to all segments of the work force. With the amendment proposed by the bill,
Federal equal employment protection will be assured to virtually every segment
of the Nation's work force.
Id. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee's report, which explained H.R. 1746,
stated:
[The 1964 Act] is amended to expand the coverage of [T]itle VII to include
employers of eight or more persons, and labor organizations with eight or more
members. The Committee agrees with the Chairman of EEOC that discrimination should be attacked wherever it exists, and recognizes that small establishments have frequently been the most flagrant violators of equal employment
opportunity.
At present, the jurisdiction of the EEOC extends to approximately 83 % of
the nation's non-agricultural work force (approximately 250,000 employers and
37,800 labor organizations). By adding the provisions as currently proposed, the
jurisdiction of the EEOC would encompass another 8% of the present work
force, or approximately 6.5 million employees and about 90,000 employers.
The need for coverage in this area is obvious. The absence of EEOC jurisdiction over these small employers and labor organizations has made it impossible for the Commission to compile sufficient information in this area to pinpoint
those areas where patterns or practices of discrimination exist. As a consequence, it has not been possible to institute changes where necessary to insure
compliance with the provisions of Title VII.
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changed the employee minimum for Title VII from twenty-five to fifteen.62
The House first passed House Bill 1746, a version of Title VII covering

employers with eight or more employees. 63 The Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare brought the bill to the Senate floor under the name Senate
Bill 2515, which retained the eight or more employee threshold.' During

the Senate debate, Senator Ervin proposed an amendment to Senate Bill
2515 to maintain the twenty-five employee threshold of the 1964 Act.65

The Senators who spoke in favor of the Ervin amendment made the same
arguments as the Senators who wanted Title VII's coverage limited in
1964:1 specifically, that the twenty-five employee limit invaded the intimate
social milieu of small businesses, prevented small minority employers from
hiring exclusively minority work forces, and created legal liability that
threatened the financial viability of small businesses.67
During the debate, Senator Fannin made the only mention of part-time

workers in Title VII's legislative history. While speaking in favor of the
Ervin amendment, Senator Fannin expressed concern that Senate Bill 2515's

expansion of Title VII's coverage would cause many small businesses to
eliminate their part-time work forces.6" Senator Fannin must have believed
Id. at 417-18.
62. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat.
103, 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994)).
63. See LABOR SUBCOMMITTEE'S REPORT, supra note 61, at 80 (discussing text of
H.R. 1746 at time bill left House).
64. Id. at 410, 417 (noting that Senate discussed H.R. 1746 under name S. 2515, and
that bill had eight-employee minimum when it arrived on Senate floor).
65. Id. at 879 (discussing Senator Ervin's amendment to S. 2515).
66. Id. at 1009-11, 1297-99 (noting Senator Cotton's and Senator Fannin's statements
in favor of Ervin amendment). Senator Cotton expressed concern that S. 2515 gave the
federal government too much power, prohibited minority businesses from hiring exclusively
within their own race, and prevented small businesses from firing insubordinate employees
for fear of costly litigation. Id. at 1010. Senator Fannin argued that S. 2515 threatened
ethnic family businesses that maintained the cultural heritage of their owners. Id. at 1298.
67. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (noting reasons advanced in favor
of Cotton amendment, which would have limited Title VII's jurisdiction to cover employers
with 100 or more employees).
68. See LABOR SUBCOMMTTEE's REPORT, supra note 61, at 1298 (noting Senator
Fannin's statements in favor of Ervin amendment). Senator Fannin stated:
I am concerned about what happens to part-time workers. It is possible
that this legislation may cause some firms to eliminate the services of semiretired employees?
We have many retirement areas in Arizona. These people need, especially
since we have had inflation in the past few years, some employment to make it
possible for them to support themselves. I feel that it is vital that they have a
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that part-time employees were counted for purposes of Title VII, for only
on such an assumption would he worry that businesses would discharge
their part-time staff to avoid jurisdiction under Title VII. However, the
significance of the statement is uncertain because there was no response to
it on the floor, and nothing in the legislative history addresses the part-time
employee question.
In the end, therefore, the Senate's reduction of Title VII's threshold of
coverage from twenty-five to fifteen employees was surrounded with as
much silence on the part-time employee question as was the original 1964
Act. 69 Nevertheless, the expanded jurisdiction added an estimated six
million private industry employees to the EEOC's jurisdiction.7' The
Senate's concern for the protection of small businesses from Title VII coverage was clearly relevant to drawing some limit on the statute's coverage,
but the way in which the Senate manifested that aim for part-time employees remained deeply ambiguous.
IlI. The Current Circuit Split over the ProperMethod of Counting
The First and Fifth Circuits and the EEOC disagree with the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits and several district courts over the proper method of
counting employees for purposes of Title VII jurisdiction. The First and
Fifth Circuits, as well as the EEOC, endorse the payroll method.7' Courts
applying this method count the number of employees on an employer's
payroll for a given week, regardless of whether every employee on the
payroll reports to work every day of the calendar week.' If an employer
maintains at least fifteen employees on the payroll for at least twenty calendar weeks during the year in which the alleged discrimination occurs, the

chance to work part time.
Id. at 1298-99.
69. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (noting absence of consideration of
part-time workers for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII at time of 1964 Act).
70. See Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A
CriticalAnalysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 1, 52 (1977) (noting increase in number of employees covered under Title VII after
1972 Act).
71. See infra part III.A (discussing and analyzing cases and EEOC Guidelines that
endorse payroll method of counting employees). For a discussion of a First Circuit opinion
that endorses the payroll method, see infra part III.A.1. For a discussion of a Fifth Circuit
opinion that endorses the payroll method, see infra part mI.A.2. For a discussion of the
EEOC's support of the payroll method, see infra part IRl.A.3.
72. See infra part ImI.A.1-2 (discussing and analyzing cases that endorse payroll
method).
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employer meets the jurisdictional minimum of Title VII. n Advocates of the

payroll method contend that, in enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act

(FMLA), Congress endorsed the payroll method. 4 Furthermore, these
courts argue that case law and the EEOC's Guidelines command use of the
payroll method.75 Finally, they assert that the payroll method better comports with public policy considerations. 76

By contrast, the Seventh and Eight Circuits, as well as several district
courts, use the Zimmerman approach. 7 The Zimmerman approach derives

from the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Zimmerman v. North American Signal
Co.7" Courts using the Zimmerman approach count all salaried employees

toward the required fifteen, but count hourly or part-time workers as
employees only on the days when those employees are physically present

at work or on paid leave.79 Fifteen employees must be at the workplace or
on paid leave for each day of the work week for that work week to count

toward the twenty-week jurisdictional minimum. I Advocates of the Zimmerman approach argue that their approach arises out of a plain text reading of the statute."

In addition, these courts claim that stare decisis com-

pels them to continue using the Zimmerman approach.'

73. See infra part 1II.A.1-2 (explaining payroll method).
74. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (comparing statutory language of
definition of employer in FMLA and Title VII). For a similar synopsis of the payroll
method, see 64 U.S.L.W. 2071, 2071 (Aug. 8, 1995) (noting circuit split over Title VII's
jurisdiction).
75. See infra part IiI.A (discussing arguments that advance payroll method by EEOC
and First and Fifth Circuits).
76. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text (discussing public policy arguments
made by EEOC that advance payroll method).
77. See infra part III.B (discussing and analyzing cases that endorse Zimmerman
approach to counting employees). For a discussion of Seventh and Eight Circuit opinions
that endorse the Zimmerman approach, see infra part MII.B.1. For a discussion of a district
court opinion that endorses the Zimmerman approach, see infra part mI.B.2.
78. 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983) (counting employees only on days when they came
to work or were on paid leave for purposes of jurisdiction under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). For a discussion and analysis of this case, see infra notes 142-59
and accompanying text.
79. See infra part .II.B
(discussing Zimmerman approach to counting employees for
purposes of jurisdiction under Title Vii).
80. See infra part III.B (explaining Zimmerman approach).
81. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (arguing that plain reading of Title
VII's text supports Zimmerman approach).
82. See infra note 178 and accompanying text (arguing that precedent of statutory
interpretation is not easily overturned).
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A. A Case Analysis of the Payroll Method

1. The First Circuit
In Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc.,83 the First Circuit considered whether
to count regular part-time employees for purposes of Title VII jurisdiction.84
The plaintiff worked as a waitress at a restaurant named "Jack's," operated
by the defendant. I When the plaintiff applied for a bartender position, the
defendant told her that he hired only men as bartenders. 86 The plaintiff filed
a lawsuit against the defendant under Title VIIY The defendant argued that
he did not employ the requisite number of employees to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII and moved to dismiss the complaint.8 8 In
deciding to count the part-time employees, the court of appeals first stated
that every court that had considered the issue of whether to count "regular"
part-time employees had decided to count those employees.89 Second, the
court distinguished Takeall v. Werd, Inc. based on the nature of the employment relationship. 9° In Takeall, a federal district court in Florida decided not
to count part-time employees who worked in a temporary capacity to cover
for regular employees who were on vacation. 91 The work habits of those
83. 717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984).
84. See Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634 (lst Cir. 1983) (holding that
part-time employees are counted for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII), cert. denied, 466

U.S. 904 (1984).
85. Id. at 633.
86. Id. at 634.
87. Id.
88. Id. The court stated:
Jack's is a small bar in Cambridge, Massachusetts which operates by having
approximately 9 employees report to work each day. Some of these employees
work full-time; most, however, work part time. In order to remain open 7 days
a week, Jack's maintained more than 15 employees on the payroll for more than
20 weeks during the relevant time although no more than 11 employees ever
reported for work on any one day.
Id.
89. Id. at 634 (citing Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 979 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1980); Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (M.D. Pa. 1980);
Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936, 941 (D. Colo. 1979); 2
ARTHUR LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

§ 5.32

(1973)).

90. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 947, 948 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
91. See Takeall v. Werd, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 947, 948 (M.D. Fla.
1979) (holding that defendant company did not employ minimum of 15 employees for purposes
of Title VII jurisdiction). In Takeall, a federal district court considered whether to count
occasional part-time employees for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII. Id. The court
found that "persons who merely filled in for a very short period of time for regular employees
taking a day off or on vacation" should not be counted as employees. Id. The Takeall court
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temporary employees were so erratic that the Thurber court was not convinced that a regular or ongoing employment relationship existed between the
temporary employees and their employer.' In Thurber, however, the parttime employees worked on a regularly scheduled basis. 93 Third, the First
Circuit stated that the legislative history of Title VII favored the payroll
method. 4 Jack Reilly's argued that by using the language "for each working
day," Congress intended to include employers who had fifteen employees
actually at work on each working day.9' The court of appeals conceded that,
at the time of Title VII's passage, Congress expressed concern about the
over-regulation of small, family, or neighborhood businesses. 96 Nevertheless, the court relied on remarks made by Senator Dirksen for support of its
interpretation of the scope of Title VII's coverage.' 7 Senator Dirksen stated
that Title VII's definition of employer came from the Unemployment Compensation Act (UCA). 98 For purposes of the UCA, employees are counted
for each day that an employment relationship exists, rather than for each day
that an employee shows up to work. 99 Although counting regular part-time
employees might bring small family businesses with a large number of parttime employees within the statute, the court of appeals found that the statute's policy preferred the inclusion of businesses that might be discriminating
over the exclusion of "Mom and Pop" stores. 100 In conclusion, the Thurber
court ruled that regular part-time employees, as distinguished from temporary
employees, should be counted for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII. 10 1
2. The Fifth Circuit
In Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 1° the Fifth Circuit considered
whether a town met the definitional requirements of an employer under Title
concluded that the defendant's occasional part-time employees should not be counted. Id.
92. Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634 (lst Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 904 (1984).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 634-35.
95. Id. at 634.
96. Id.

97. Id.
98. Id. (citing 110 CONG. REc. 13,087 (1964)).
99. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 55-19, 1955-1 C.B. 496). According to the court: "This ruling
had been in force for nine years prior to the enactment of Title VII." Id.

100. Id. at 635.
101. Id.
102. 612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980).
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VII. °3 Joannie Dumas, an African-American female, sued the town of
Mount Vernon for alleged racial discrimination."4 The district court found
that the defendants did not employ the requisite fifteen employees and dis-

missed the action.1 5 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit also concluded that
Mount Vernon employed fewer than the minimum of fifteen employees

during the relevant years. 06 In a footnote to the decision, the court of
appeals stated that individuals on the payroll are counted whether or not
they worked full time on any particular day of a given week. 7 Neverthe-

less, even after counting part-time employees, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that Mount Vernon did not meet the statutory definition of employer. 108
3. The EEOC's View

The EEOC, an independent federal agency, administers Title VII. 19
In support of the payroll method, the EEOC contends that the legislative
history of Title VII indicates that courts should look to the existence of an

employment relationship rather than to the number of hours that an employee works," 0 that the payroll method comports with both the legislative

intent and the statutory language "for each working day,""' and that public
policy considerations weigh in favor of counting all employees on the
payroll.'
In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC illustrates the difference
103. See Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 1980) (counting
part-time employees for purposes of Title VII jurisdiction).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 976-77 (citing Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 436 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Ala.
1977)).
106. Id. at 979.
107. Id. at 979 n.7 (citing BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 837-38 (1976 & Supp. 1979)).
108. Id. at 980.
109. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a), 2000e-5(a) (1994). Section 2000e-4(a) establishes
the EEOC with the following statement: "There is hereby created a Commission to be
known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which shall be composed of five
members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same political party." Id.
§ 2000e-4(a). Section 2000e-5(a) establishes the enforcement provisions of the EEOC by
stating: "The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth in [§] 2000e-2 [unlawful
employment practices] or 2000e-3 [other unlawful employment practices] of [Title VIHJ."
Id. § 2000e-5(a).
110. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC's argument that
legislative history favors payroll method).
111. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC's argument that
payroll method comports with both legislative intent and statutory language of Title VII).
112. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC's argument that
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between the payroll method and the Zimmerman approach." 3 According to
the EEOC, a majority of courts considering the issue have applied the payroll method." 4 In citing these cases, the EEOC notes that these courts did

not distinguish between full-time employees and employees who work only
part of each day or part of each week." 5 The EEOC argues that, in light

payroll method is better method for public policy reasons).
113. EEOC, EEOC AND THE LAWS IT ENFORCES: A REFERENCE MANUAL § 605.8(b)
(1986). The EEOC illustrated its counting method of both full-time and part-time employees
with the following two examples:
Example 1 - CP filed a charge of national origin discrimination against R in
December 1978. R alleges that the [EEOC] does not have jurisdiction over it
because it employs only 13 employees. After obtaining the information in
(1) and (2) below, the EOS determined that R has 13 regular full-time employees
who worked all year in 1978 and 1977 with the exception of two weeks vacation
each. The EOS is also able to determine that R employed 10 part-time and
temporary employees both years. Six of these employees worked each working
day during each of 26 weeks during 1978. Adding these six employees to the 13
regular full-time employees, R employs 19 individuals and is an employer within
the meaning of § 701(b). Compare the following example.
Example 2 - R employed 10 full-time employees in 1978 and 1979. For the
first 26 weeks of the year, R also employed 4 part-time employees. For the last
10 weeks, R employed 8 part-time employees. The [EEOC] would not have jurisdiction over a charge filed by R's employee. During the relevant time period,
R did not employ 15 or more employees during each of 20 weeks.
Id. at 605.8(b) (emphasis added).
114. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2167, at 2313-11 to 2313-12 (1990). The
EEOC cited Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying
payroll method of counting employees for purposes of Title VII jurisdiction), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 904 (1984); Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 979 n.7 (5th Cir.
1980) (same); Evans v. Davie Truckers, Inc., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1553, 1554
(M.D.N.C. 1984) (same), aft'd, 769 F.2d 1012 (4th. Cir. 1985); Lynn v. JER Corp., 573
F. Supp. 17, 20 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (same); Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp.
1091, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (same); Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F.
Supp. 936, 941 (D. Colo. 1979) (same); Pascutoi v. Washburn-McReavy Mortuary, 11 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325, 1327 (D. Minn. 1975) (same), aff'd, 566 F.2d 1178 (8th
Cir. 1977). The EEOC also cited Gorman v. North Pittsburgh Oral Surgery Assocs., 664
F. Supp. 212, 214 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (applying payroll method of counting employees for
purposes ofjurisdiction under ADEA); Musser v. Mountain View Broadcasting, Inc., 578
F. Supp. 229, 230 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (same); 1 ARTHUR LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-

NATION § 5.32 (1987) (advocating payroll method of counting employees); BARBARA L.
SCHLEI & PHILLIP GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 996 (2d ed. 1983)
(same).
115. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCII) 2167, at 2313-11 (1990). The EEOC stated
that the payroll method of counting does not take into account whether or not an employee
reported to work on any given day: "Therefore, all regular part-time employees are counted
whether they work part of each day or part of each week." Id.
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of the legislative history, their interpretation of the statute's language,1 6 and
public policy considerations, the payroll method should be adopted.
First, the EEOC asserts that the legislative history of Title VII indicates that the employment relationship - and not the employee's work
schedule - should be considered when counting employees.11 7 The EEOC
states that Congress borrowed Title Vii's definition of employer from the
UCA." 8 In a revenue ruling, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruled that,
under the UCA, employees are counted for each day that an employment
relationship exists.11 9 Because Congress modeled Title Vii's definition of
employer after the UCA's definition of employer, the EEOC takes the
position that Congress must have been aware of the IRS's interpretation and
must have intended Title VII to be subject to that interpretation. 1 The
EEOC also maintains that the absence of legislative history indicating that
employees must report each day of the work week to be counted means that
Congress did not intend to distinguish between part-time and full-time
employees.
Second, the EEOC contends that a proper construction of Title VII's
language supports the payroll method." As stated above, the EEOC maintains that Congress intended for part-time employees to be counted."z The
EEOC also argues that Congress enacted Title VII as a remedial statute and
intended for the statute to be applied broadly. 24 According to the EEOC,
a literal interpretation of "for each working day" that counts employees
only when they show up to work each day of the work week is contrary to
Congress's remedial intent."z When an interpretation of apparent legislative intent conflicts with a literal interpretation of the statute, 1the EEOC
states that the interpretation of legislative intent should prevail. 6

116. Id. at 2313-12.
117. Id.
118. Id. (borrowing analysis from Thurber decision).
119. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 55-19, 1955-1 C.B. 496).
120. Id. (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979) for
proposition that, when discerning legislative intent, courts may assume elected representatives know current law).
121. Id. (citing Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 635 (1st Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984)).
122. Id. at 2313-12 to 2313-13.
123. Id. at 2313-13.
124. Id. (citing debates of Senators Morse and Saltonstall in 110 CONG. REC. 13,087-93
(1964)).
125. Id.
126.

Id. at 2313-12 to 2313-13 (citing NORMAN SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND'S

STATUTORY
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The EEOC also concludes that the words "for each working day" have
enough flexibility to comport with an interpretation that counts part-time
workers. 27 The language "for each working day" does not literally mean
days "at work," and the phrase contains no language that limits coverage
to those employees who show up to work every day.Y The EEOC also
points out that the definition of employee does not contain any language

relating to the number of hours that an individual, works.129 In addition, the
EEOC cites several federal court decisions stating that any of the ambiguresolved
ities in Title VII's definition of employer or employee should 1be
30

in favor of coverage because of the statute's remedial purpose.
Third, the EEOC states that public policy considerations weigh 13in
1
favor of a broad interpretation of Title VII's definition of employer.
Counting employees under the Zimmerman approach can yield problematic
results. 2 For example, under the Zimmerman approach, courts would
count "employee A," who works only two hours each day of a five-day

work week. 33 These courts, however, would. not count "employee B," who
CONSTRUCTION § 46.07 (1984)). As a broad principle, Singer states:
The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a
result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislation and if the words are
sufficiently flexible to allow a construction which will effectuate the legislative
intention. The intention prevails over the letter, and the letter must if possible
be read to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature
must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and
obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of
such words.
NORMAN SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.07 (1984).
127. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2167, at 2313-12 to 2313-13 (1990).
128. See id. (stating that "for each working day" means having employees for each
working day and not necessarily employees working each working day). The EEOC further
states that the statutory language of Title VII does not "contain any limitation indicating that
only those individuals actually at the work site on each working day are to be considered
employees under Title VII." Id.
129. Id. (citing Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936, 941

(D. Colo. 1979)).
130. Id. (citing Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634-35 (1st Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1341 (6th Cir.
1983); Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980); Baker
v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977); Pascutoi v. WashburnMcReavy Mortuary, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325, 1326-27 (D. Minn. 1975),
aff'd, 566 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1977)).
131. Id. at 2313-13 to 2313-14.
132. Id. at 2313-13.
133. Id.
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works eight hours for each of four days out of a five-day work week. 14
Thus, the courts would count employee A, who works ten hours per week,
but not employee B, who works thirty-two hours per week.' 3 5 In addition,
employers could conceivably manipulate a work schedule to avoid Title VII
coverage.136 Employers could claim that they have a seven-day work week
so that employees who work a typical five-day, forty-hour work week would
not be counted.' 37 The EEOC also emphasizes the difficulty in counting
employees under the Zimmennan approach. 138 An employer's payroll records
may indicate the number of hours that an employee worked in a given week,
but not the days that the employee worked. 139 The EEOC emphasizes, however, that parties and courts easily can acquire payroll records in order to use
the payroll method. 1'
B. A Case Analysis of the Zimmerman Approach
1. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits
In Zimmennan v. North American Signal Co.,
the Seventh Circuit
considered whether to count hourly paid workers as employees for purposes
of jurisdiction under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).142
Sam Zimmerman, who was sixty-seven years of age, sued his employer,
North American Signal Company (North American), for age discrimination
in violation of the ADEA.'43 The district court ruled that North American
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The EEOC states that a business could operate with all part-time employees
(or almost all part-time employees) to escape the prohibitions of Title VII, despite the
number of employees actually employed. Id. (citing Gorman v. North Pittsburgh Oral
Surgery Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 212, 214 (W.D. Pa. 1987)).
138. Id.
139. Id. The EEOC stated:
[P]roof under the Zimmerman approach would be difficult for plaintiffs to obtain. Even
assuming that an employer kept and maintained time cards and leave records, it would
be an extremely tedious task to determine how many employees reported to work each
day during the two-year period provided for by the statute.

Id.
140. Id.
141. 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983).
142. See Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that part-time employees are not counted on days when they do not show up to
work or are not on paid leave for purposes of jurisdiction under ADEA).
143. Id. at 349. In prohibiting age discrimination by employers, the ADEA states:
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
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did not meet the statutory definition of employer because the company
employed fewer than fifteen employees. 44
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that the ADEA and Title VII share
identical language regarding the definition of employer.145 The ADEA
defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ....
North American counted salaried employees for every day of the week that
they appeared on the payroll, but counted hourly paid workers only on days
when they worked or were on paid leave. 47 After counting the number of
employees at work on a given day, the company counted the number of
weeks over the relevant year when twenty or more employees were
present. 48 The plaintiff, on the other hand, counted all salaried and hourly
49
paid workers regardless of whether they worked or were on paid leave. 1
The plaintiff simply counted North American's employees by counting the
number of workers on the payroll for a given week.1°
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).

144. Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 349.
145.

Id. at 352.

146. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
147. Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1983). Under
North American's system of counting:
[A]n hourly paid worker who worked Monday through Thursday is not counted as an
employee on Friday, regardless of the number of hours he worked that week and
regardless of whether he is a permanent employee who will return the next week or a
temporary employee who will not. If that worker is given a week of paid vacation, he
is counted as an employee for each day of that week.

Id.
148. Id. North American did not count weeks when the number of employees present
fell below 20 on any day of the week:
[R]egardless of the number of employees counted on the rest of the days. For example, for the week ending February 2, 1979, North American's analysis shows nineteen
employees on Friday and twenty employees on Monday through Thursday. Since the
count fell below twenty on Friday, North American does not count this week toward
the jurisdictional minimum.

Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Using Zimmerman's counting method:
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The Zimmerman court acknowledged that other courts have adopted the
payroll method."' In addition, the Seventh Circuit conceded that, in light
of its remedial nature, the ADEA's definition of employer should be given

a liberal reading in order to effectuate its purpose.'5 I Nevertheless, the
court cautioned that an interpretation of a remedial statute cannot contradict

the statutory definition.15 3 According to the court of appeals, the phrase
"for each working day" refers to employees who work each day during the

work week. 54 The court, therefore, could not reconcile the payroll method

with the statutory definition of employer because the payroll method counts

all employees on the payroll, whether or not they report to work each day
of the week. 55 Finally, the court stated that Congress could have exempted
certain small employers from the definition of employer by carefully deline-

ating a required number of employees on a payroll, the number of hours
worked by each employee, the number of full-time or part-time employees

on a payroll, or the total number of hours worked by employees.156 Under
any restriction, close cases like Zimmerman will exist."' According to the
court of appeals, however, the existence of close cases did not justify an
especially broad interpretation of statutory language that Congress did
[The week ending February 2, 1979 would be included toward the jurisdictional
minimum... because twenty [employees] received paychecks for work done or leave
taken during that work week. In essence, the hourly paid worker who worked
Monday through Thursday would be considered an employee on Friday also, based
...
on the proposition that the employment relationship is not broken on the day he
does not work, at least if he returns the next week, as most North American workers
seem to do.

Id.

151. Id. at 353 (citing Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091 (M.D. Pa.
1980); Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1979);
Pascutoi v. Washburn-McReavy Mortuary, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (D.
Minn. 1975)).

152. Id. (citing Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970);
Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977)).
153. Id. The court stated that, "[a]s a general rule, a court should not construe a statute
in a way that makes words or phrases meaningless, redundant, or superfluous." Id. (citing
United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 1980); Conway County
Farmers Ass'n v. United States, 588 F.2d 592, 598 (8th Cir. 1978); Zeigler Coal Co. v.
Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 354. The court stated that under the payroll method, "an hourly paid worker
who works two hours each Monday would be counted as an employee for every day of the
week, a result we believe would be contrary to the explicit definitional restriction chosen
by Congress." Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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choose. 8 The Seventh Circuit concluded that employees should be counted
only on days when they report to work or are on paid leave.Y 9
The Eighth Circuit also has supported the Zimmerman approach. In

McGraw v. Warren County Oil Co.,"6 the Eighth Circuit considered whether

part-time employees who do not work each day of the work week should be

counted for purposes of jurisdiction under the ADEA.' 6 The court did not

analyze the debate over counting part-time employees. 62 Rather, the Eighth
Circuit merely affirmed the decision of the district court with a citation to

Zimmerman!'6
In EEOC v. Metropolitan EducationalEnterprises,Inc.,

4

the Seventh

Circuit recently considered whether to apply the Zimmerman approach to
Title VII.'1 The EEOC and plaintiff-intervenor Darlene Walters brought

suit against Metropolitan. Walters alleged that the defendant fired her in
retaliation for her filing of a gender discrimination charge. '1 The Metropolitan court initially noted that Title VII does not state a method of counting

employees to determine jurisdiction under the statute. 67 After explaining

the Zimmerman approach and the payroll method,' 68 the Metropolitancourt
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 707 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1983).
161. See McGraw v. Warren County Oil Co., 707 F.2d 990, 991 (8th Cir. 1983) (deciding that part-time employees are not counted for purposes of jurisdiction under ADEA).
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983)).
164. 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
165. See EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1226 (7th Cir.
1995) (deciding that part-time employees are not counted on days when they do not report
to work or are not on paid leave), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 1260 (1996).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1227.
168. Id. In describing the payroll method, the court stated:
One, endorsed by the EEOC and adopted by a number of courts, is the "payroll
method." It looks at the number of employees maintained on an employer's payroll
within a given week: if this number is at least 15 for at least 20 calendar weeks the
jurisdictional minimum is satisfied, regardless of whether or not every employee on
the payroll shows up for work every day of the calendar week.
Id. Describing the Zimmerman approach, the court stated:
The alternative method counts all salaried employees toward the minimum, but takes
a different approach toward hourly or part-time workers. Such workers are considered employees only on days when they are physically present at work or are on paid
leave. The jurisdictional minimum of employees must be at the workplace or on paid
leave for each day of the work week, or the week will not be counted.
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agreed with the Zimmerman court's ruling. 169 The Metropolitan court stated
that Title VII's legislative history offered little assistance in determining the
proper method for counting employees,17 that Title VII and the ADEA shared
the same definition of employer,' 7' and that interpretation of the ADEA's
coverage set a precedent for an interpretation of Title VII's coverage."
On appeal, the plaintiffs criticized the Zimmerman approach on three
counts. I 7 First, the plaintiffs argued that in enacting the FMLA, 74
1 Congress
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352-53 (7th Cir.
1983)). The Metropolitan court stated:
Plaintiffs contend that in fact, the legislative history of Title VII supports their
reading, and base this argument on remarks of Senator Dirksen which suggest that
Title VII's definition of employer was borrowed from the Unemployment Compensation Act. Although certain remarks of Senator Dirksen are consistent with
plaintiffs' argument, we agree with the Zimmerman court that the legislative history
of Title VII is too confused and chaotic to be of much use.
Id. at 1227 n.3 (referencing EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir.
1974)).
171. Id. at 1227. The Metropolitan court stated:
Seeing no way to reconcile the phrase "for each working day" with the payroll
method, the panel held that the correct method excluded hourly paid workers on
days when they were neither working nor on paid leave. To conclude otherwise,
the Zimmerman panel held, would render the words "for each working day" superfluous and would be contrary to the "explicit definitional restriction chosen by
Congress." The panel also noted that had Congress wanted to define the jurisdictional minimum in terms of the number of employees on the payroll each week, it
could certainly have done so.
Id.
172. Id. The Metropolitan court stated:
Zimmerman, as we have stated, involved a claim brought under the ADEA rather
than one brought pursuant to Title VII. The district court, however, properly found
Zimmerman dispositive. Because Title VII and the ADEA have a common purpose,
we have relied upon cases interpreting a definition in one statute as persuasive when
construing a similar definition in the other.
Id. at 1227 n.2 (citing Hayden v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 9 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1371 (1993)). The court stated that "[tihe ADEA's definition is 'essentially identical to Title VII's,' and '[c]ourts routinely apply arguments' to the two interchangeably." Id. (quoting EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.1
(7th Cir. 1995); Zimmerman v. North Am.Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1983)).
The court further stated: "While Walters argues that we may view this case unfettered by
Zimmernan, therefore, the mirror similarity between the definition of employer in the two
contexts and their common purposes counsels - indeed requires - deference to our precedent." Id.
173. Id. at 1227-28.
174. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
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endorsed the payroll method over the Zimmerman approach. 75 Second, the
plaintiffs contended that case law and the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII
challenged the legitimacy of the Zimmerman approach.' 76 Third, the plaintiffs
asserted that the payroll method comported better with the public policy considerations of Title VII.'7 As the Seventh Circuit addressed these arguments,
the court noted that overturning circuit precedent required compelling
reasons.' 78 The court of appeals then emphasized the importance of reading
Title VII's plain texti79 The court concluded that the most natural interpretation of the phrase "for each working day" counts only employees physically
at work. im The Seventh Circuit stated that the payroll method, which looks
at situations when employees join or exit the payroll in the middle of the
week, suggests a highly unlikely reading of the statutory language.'
Such
situations, said the court, are so rare that Congress probably would not include such considerations in Title VII. ' The court of appeals also stated that
although Congress could have worded the statute more clearly, the Zimmerman court's plain reading of the text was correct because it endured the
scrutiny of several courts.1i3
The Seventh Circuit addressed the plaintiff's comparison of Title VII to
the FMLA.184 The court acknowledged that the Senate report of the FMLA
endorsed the payroll method. i8 Congress intended the definition of employer

175. Id. The FMLA defines an employer as "any person engaged in commerce or in

any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding year."

Id. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
176. EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202
(1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)).
179. Id. at 1228.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.

183. Id. According to the Seventh Circuit, if a court can "glean the meaning of a
statute from its text," the court should not look to other sources to assist in the interpretation
of the statute. Id. (citing United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2252 (1995)).

184. Id.
185. Id. The FMLA defines an employer as "any person engaged in commerce or in
any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each
working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding
calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1994).
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under the FMLA to receive the same interpretation as the definition received
under Title VII. ,8 The court also admitted that the EEOC and many courts
interpreted the word "employs" to mean "maintains on the payroll."'8' Yet,
the Seventh Circuit found the congressional commentary unpersuasive for two
reasons." 8 First, the Congress that passed the FMLA had no express authority to interpret the previous congressional action that resulted in Title VII.189
Moreover, only the FMLA's legislative history, and not the FMLA's text,
contained an interpretation of Title VII.'I9 The court asserted that legislative
history has no force of law."'9 The Metropolitan court also cited the Supreme
Court's rejection of the notion that judicial interpretation of a statute must
defer to legislative reports."9 The Seventh Circuit concluded that if Congress
truly intended to enact the payroll method it would have stated the method
clearly and unambiguously in the text of Title VII., 9 3 Congress knew of the
various judicial interpretations of Title VII's coverage when it enacted the
FMLA, yet Congress failed to enact either of the interpretations into law. 194
186. EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1995),

cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
187. Id. In other words, "[i]t is not necessary that every employee actually perform
work on each working day to be considered for this purpose." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 3,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 24).
188. Id.
189. Id. The Metropolitan court stated that "[t]he interpretation given by one Congress
(or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning
the meaning of that statute." Id. (citing Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492
U.S. 158, 168 (1989)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1228-29 ("As the District of Columbia Circuit recently observed, 'A
congressional report, even a conference report, is not legislation ... and it does not change
the law."') (quoting In re North, 50 F.3d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); see also Davel v.
Sullivan, 902 F.2d 559, 562 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that "[t]he words of the statute,
not the words of the legislative history, control statutory interpretation").
192. EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996). The Metropolitan court stated:
The [Supreme] Court held that where there was an "almost uniform appellate
interpretation" of legislation, re-enactment of the same statutory language would
be presumed to re-enact that "settled judicial interpretation" regardless of a
legislative report to the contrary. While further action taken by Congress can
justify the abandonment of statutory precedent, legislative history is not akin to
legislative action.
Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567-68 (1988)).
193. Id.
194. Id. The Metropolitan court stated that Congress knew of the problems with the
language "for each working day" because of Zimmerman and other similar cases: "If indeed
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In addition, the Seventh Circuit addressed the plaintiffs' arguments that
judicial and regulatory authority supported overruling Zimmerman.195 The
Metropolitan court stated that the Eighth Circuit and several district courts
followed the Zimmerman approach. 91 6 Moreover, the court noted that the
EEOC's Compliance Manual advocated the payroll method long after the
Zimmerman decision.191 The Metropolitan court refused to defer to an
agency interpretation of statutory language after the court already had ruled

on the issue.'
The Seventh Circuit then responded to the plaintiffs' public policy arguments. 99 The court declined to interpret the FMLA and, thereby, to create

Congress wished to resolve the [c]ircuit conflict in a particular direction, this was 'a strange
way to make a change."' Id.
195. Id. The court noted that the First and Fifth Circuits and a number of district
courts had adopted the payroll method. Id. at 1229 & n.5. In support of this proposition,
the court cited Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634-35 (1st Cir. 1983)
(adopting payroll method of counting employees), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984); Dumas
v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 979 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Reith v.
Swenson, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 897 (D. Kan. 1993) (same); Cohen v.
S.U.P.A., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 251, 254-56 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); Vano v. Au, No. Civ.
A. 910038-H, 1992 WL 175498, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 16, 1992) (same); Gorman v. North
Pittsburgh Oral Surgery Assocs., Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 212, 214 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (same);
Evans v. Davie Truckers, Inc., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1553, 1554 (M.D.N.C.
1984) (same), aff'd, 69 F.2d 1012 (4th. Cir. 1985); Lynn v. JER Corp., 573 F. Supp. 17,
20 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (same); Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091, 1098
(M.D. Pa. 1980) (same); and Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F.
Supp. 936, 941 (D. Colo. 1979) (same). See Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1229. Moreover,
"[t]he EEOC's Statement of Policy Guidance explicitly rejects the Zimmerman approach and
endorses the payroll method." Id. at 1229 (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2167, at
2313-12 (1990)).
196. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1229 & n.6. As examples, the court cited EEOC v.
Garden and Assocs., Ltd., 956 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1992) (using Zimmerman approach to count
employees for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VI1); McGraw v. Warren County Oil Co.,
707 F.2d 990, 991 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Richardson v. Bedford Place Hous. Phase I
Assocs., 855 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (same); Wright v. Kosciusko Medical Clinic,
Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (same); Lord v. Casco Bay Weekly, Inc.,
789 F. Supp. 32, 34-35 (D. Me. 1992) (same); Norman v. Levy, 756 F. Supp. 1060, 106364 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (same); EEOC v. Argent Indus., 746 F. Supp. 705, 708.09 (S.D. Ohio
1989) (same); and Schoenbaum v. Orange County Ctr. for the Performing Arts, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 1036, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (same)). Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1229 & n.6.
197. EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 1260 (1996).
198. Id. at 1229-30 (citing Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). The court stated that "the judiciary, not administrative
agencies, is the final arbiter of statutory construction." Id.
199. Id. at 1330.
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a conflict among the circuits when none had existed before.'
The plaintiffs
argued that under Zimmerman, an employer could evade Title VII liability
by structuring its work force to avoid having fifteen employees present on
each working day." ° Nevertheless, the Metropolitan court noted that, in
over a decade since the court had decided Zimmerman, few employers actually had attempted to avoid jurisdiction through such tactics.' Although the
payroll method can be implemented more easily than the Zimmerman approach, the Metropolitan court stated that the policy of administrative feasibility did not override the authority of its established statutory interpretation.3 In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the Zimmerman approach and dismissed the plaintiff's suit for lack
of jurisdiction. 04
2. The Northern Districtof Georgia
In Richardson v. Bedford Place Housing Phase I Associates, 5 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia criticized several cases that applied the payroll nethod and held that hourly wage
employees should not be counted for weeks in which they did not work every
day.' The plaintiff sued her employer for sexual discrimination under Title
VII.07 The magistrate ruled that the defendant satisfied the fifteen-employee
threshold."°8 On appeal to the district court, the defendant argued that either
part-time employees did not count toward reaching the jurisdictional minimum or that part-time employees counted only when they worked at least a
portion of each day of the week.m9
The Richardson court recognized that many courts construe Title VII
liberally and count all employees on the payroll.2 0 In discussing those cases,
200. See id. ("We have not yet been asked to interpret the FMLA and decline to create
a conflict where none yet exists.").
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 855 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
206. See Richardson v. Bedford Place Hous. Phase I Assoc., 855 F. Supp. 366, 367
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (ruling that part-time employees are not to be counted for purposes of
jurisdiction under Title VII).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing Cohen v. S.U.P.A., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Vano
v. Au, No. Civ. A. 91-0038-H, 1992 WL 175498, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 16, 1992); Gorman
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the court noted that most of the cases that endorse the payroll method relied
on the reasoning in Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc. and Dumas v. Town of Mt.
Vernon.211 In attacking the First Circuit's decision in Thurber, the Richardson court first noted that the First Circuit relied particularly on Senator Dirksen's statement that Title VII's definition of employer came from the definition of employer in the UCA.21 2 The Richardson court stated that Title VII
defines employer with language far different from that of the UCA.213 The
UCA defines an employer as any person who "on each of some twenty days
during the calendar year or during the preceding calendar year, each day
being in a different calendar week, employed at least one individual in employment for some portion of the day." 214 In contrast, Title VII defines an
employer as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. ",215 The Richardson court stated that a regulation drafted under the UCA would focus on the
existence of an employment relationship for the purpose of counting employees. 216 The court asserted that the language in the two statutes was not close
enough to credit Senator Dirksen's assertion. z 7 Congress could have written
Title VII with language more similar to the UCA if Congress had wanted
Tide VII's definition of employer to require a consideration of employment
relationships for each day of the work week, rather than a consideration of
v. North Pittsburgh Oral Surgery Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 212, 214 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Lynn
v. JER Corp., 573 F. Supp. 17, 19 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); Hornick v. Borough of Duryea,
507 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies,
465 F. Supp. 936, 940-41 (D. Colo. 1979); Pascutoi v. Washburn-McReavy Mortuary, 11
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (D. Minn. 1975)).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(1)(B) (1994).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). The term employer, however, does not include:
(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the
United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of
Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined
in section 2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than
a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title
26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer
than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.
Id.
216. Richardson v. Bedford Place Hous. Phase I Assoc., 855 F. Supp. 366, 367 (N.D.
Ga. 1994).
217. Id.
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whether employees report to work each day of the work week. 218 In further
criticism of Thurber, the Richardson court noted that the First Circuit relied
on court opinions that cited a particular statement from the congressional
debate over Title VII: "The 'term' employer is intended to have its common
dictionary meaning [and] employers with part-time or seasonal staffs were
intended to be covered by the act when the number of employees exceeds the
minimum figure."2 19 According to the Richardson court, this statement did
not reveal the legislative intent of Title VII's coverage for two reasons:'
First, Title VII's definition does not distinguish between part-time and fulltime employees."
A part-time worker still would be included, without
Thurber's interpretation, if that employee worked "each working day" of a
particular week.'
Second, if Congress intended "employer" to be defined
by its common dictionary meaning, the definition in the statute would contain
broader language, such as that found in most dictionary definitions of the
word.Y
The Richardson court also criticized the Dumas opinion. I The court
noted that Dumas actually did not interpret Title VII's definition of employer.' In Dumas, the employer would not have met the minimum number
of employees for Title VII coverage under either counting method. 2 In a
footnote, the Dumas court relied on Barbara Lindemann Schlei's and Paul
Grossman's Employment DiscriminationLaw.' 7 That treatise relied solely
on Pascutoiv. Washington-McReavy Mortuary, Inc.'- The Pascutoi decision
218. Id.
219. Id. (citing Homick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (M.D. Pa.
1980); Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936, 941 (D. Colo. 1979)).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. The Richardson court cited WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIoNARY 743 (1981) (defining employer as "the owner of an enterprise ... that employs personnel for wages or salaries") and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 618 (4th. ed. 1968) (defining
employer as "one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who
pays their wages or salaries"). Richardson v. Bedford Place Hous. Phase I Assoc., 855 F.
Supp. 366, 369-70 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
224. Richardson, 855 F. Supp. at 370.
225. Id. (citing Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980)).
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing Dumas, 612 F.2d at 979 n.7 (citing BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 837 (1976 & Supp. 1979)).
228.

BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 837

(1976 & Supp. 1979); see Pascutoi v. Washington-McReavy Mortuary, Inc., 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325, 1327 (D. Minn. 1975) (ruling that company employing aggregate of
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found Title VII's remedial nature and contemporary working conditions to
be a sufficient basis to hold that an employee does not have to work every
day of the week to be counted under Title VII. 19 As a result of Pascutoi's
lack of examination of statutory language and lack of discussion of the payroll method, the Richardson court found Pascutoi, and therefore Dumas,
0
unpersuasive. 23
In support of the Zimmerman approach, the Richardson court cited
numerous cases that counted employees only when those employees worked
15 full-time and part-time employees met jurisdictional minimum despite fact that company
rarely had more than aggregate of 14 employees on any one day). In Pascutoi, a federal
district court considered whether a person must work 40 hours or more during a seven-day
period to be counted as an employee under Title VII. Id. at 1326. The plaintiff, Brigitte
Pascutoi, worked for a mortuary run by the defendant. Id. After the mortuary discharged her,
she sued her former employer for wrongful discharge based on gender and for denial of work
opportunities based on gender. Id. The defendants contested the court's jurisdiction because
they did not employ 15 employees on each working day of the work week. Id. The defendants also argued that the legislative history of the 1972 Act indicated that Title VII only
covered employers with 15 or more full-time employees. Id. Pointing to two opinions by the
EEOC General Counsel, the plaintiff argued that all employees on an employer's payroll
should be counted to determine jurisdiction under Title VII. Id. The court stated that Congress created the 1964 Act and the 1972 Act for remedial purposes and that they should be
given a broad interpretation consistent with this purpose. Id. at 1327 (citing EEOC v. Eagle
Iron Works, 367 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 433 F.2d
421 (8th Cir. 1970)). The court also noted that the EEOC's interpretation of the statute
deserved great deference. Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). The
court found that the mortuary employed, on average, 10 or 11 full-time employees working
over 40 hours per week; 5 or 6 part-time employees working between 25 and 45 hours per
week; and 1 or 2 other part-time employees working less than 25 hours per week. Id. The
Pascutoi court concluded that the mortuary met the minimum requirements for Title VII
jurisdiction. Id.
229. Richardson v. Bedford Place Hous. Phase I Assoc., 855 F. Supp. 366, 370 (N.D.
Ga. 1994). The Richardson court stated:
Subsequent editions of this treatise cite to the Pedreyra, Hornick, Thurber and
Dwnas opinions. Another oft-cited treatise, relied on by the Thurber court, also
relies on Pascutoi in summarily reading the same conclusion on the meaning of
section 2000e(b)'s "for each working day" language. Both treatises, however,
provide no analysis themselves regarding the true meaning of this language.
Id. at 370 n.6.
230. Id. at 370. The Richardson court stated:
The EEOC relies particularly on Thurber and Dumas in taking the position that
employees are counted regardless of whether they work less than each day of the
work week. EEOC Policy Statement No. 915-052 (April 20, 1990). It is not
surprising that the administrative agency in charge of enforcement of Title VII
would choose the most expansive reading of its jurisdiction. The Policy Statement,
however, adds no additional analysis on the meaning of the section.
Id. at 370 n.7.
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each day of the work week.3' Those cases found little guidance from Title
VII's legislative history and instead relied on the words "for each working
day. 11 2 The Richardson court agreed with these opinions for three reasons:1 3 First, the court noted that a plain reading of Title VII reveals that an
employee should be counted only for the weeks that the employee worked
every day of the work week.'3 Otherwise, the clause "for each working
day" would be superfluous. 5 Second, the court stated that Title VII's legislative history did not explain why Congress selected a minimum number of
employees." 6 When a statute's legislative history is uncertain, a court may
interpret a statute by relying on a plain reading of the statute's text. 3 7 Third,
the court asserted that a literal interpretation of Title VII should be favored
over an interpretation based on legislative history. 2 8 Congress passed the
1972 Act, which reduced the number of employees from twenty-five to fifteen, after debates concerning how many employees should be covered and
whether increasing the coverage would overload the court dockets.u39 The
Richardson court noted that Congress did not pass Title VII with the intention of covering all employers affecting interstate commerce.' ° Whether the
product of political compromise or of a desire to protect small businesses
from liability under Title VII, Congress established a specific limitation on
231. Id. at 370. The court cited EEOC v. Garden & Assocs., Ltd., 956 F.2d 842, 844
(8th Cir. 1992) (counting employees only when those employees showed up to work each
day of work week); McGraw v. Warren County Oil Co., 707 F.2d 990, 991 (8th Cir. 1983)
(same); Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 1983) (same);
Lord v. Casco Bay Weekly, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D. Me. 1992) (same); Norman v.
Levy, 756 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (refusing to count hourly paid workers
when they did not show up to work). Richardson v. Bedford Place Hous. Phase I Assoc.,
855 F. Supp. 366, 370 (N.D. Ga. 1994). Discussing Zimmerman, the Richardson court
explained that:
The Seventh Circuit ... made a distinction between hourly and salary employees.

While a presumption that a salary employee works each day of the working week may
be appropriate, the language itself does not necessarily lend itself to such a reading.
Such a distinction, however, between hourly or salary employees is unnecessary for
this court to consider since the employees at issue were paid hourly wages.
Id. at 370 n.8.
232. Id. at 370.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 370-71.
240. Id. at 371.
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coverage.24 The Richardson court concluded that Title VII's legislative
history did not support reading Title VII to maximize the inclusion of employers and,
as a result, endorsed a literal interpretation of Title VII's lan242
guage.
Finally, the Richardson court noted that the Zimmerman approach did
not lack flexibility4 3 and articulated two additional defenses of the Zimmerman approach:' 4 First, under the Zimmerman approach, rather than falsely
dividing part-time and full-time employees, a court should only inquire
whether the employee worked every day of the work week.245 Second, although some small businesses may evade Title VII's jurisdiction under the
Zimmerman approach, that result is consistent with congressional intent.'
Congress clearly established a limitation on coverage.247 Therefore, a narrower reading is necessary to further congressional intent.'
In conclusion,
the Richardson court followed the Zimmerman approach endorsed by the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits. 24 9
IV. Argument
A. An Argument for CongressionalEnactment of a
Uniform Method of Counting Employees
An argument for a uniform method of counting among the judicial circuits rests on one simple principle: equality. In cases where an employer's
total combined work force of full-time and part-time employees fluctuates
around fifteen, the ability of a plaintiff to seek a federal remedy for employment discrimination should not depend on geographical location. The same
principle applies to small businesses: They should neither enjoy the advantages of exemption from a federal discrimination statute nor suffer legal and
financial liability from a federal discrimination statute simply because of their
location in a particular judicial circuit. In his concurring opinion in EEOC
v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., Judge Kenneth F. Ripple
241.

Id.

242. Id.
243.

Id.

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Zimmerman approach applied to Title
VII and that part-time employees are counted in weeks only when they worked every day
of given work week), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996). For a discussion of the
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also argued that the present disagreement over Title VII's coverage must be
clarified.351 Furthermore, this circuit split has festered for over two decades.
The Supreme Court will sometimes allow a circuit split to persist for a period of time to provide the circuits an opportunity either to resolve the dispute
themselves, or at a minimum, to exhaust the issue with arguments and analysis so that the Supreme Court can consider a fully developed question. The
question of whether to count part-time employees has been exhausted, and
the circuit dialectic will never yield an answer because Congress never considered the question. 2
A uniform method for counting employees could be established in either
of two ways. First, Congress could amend Title VII to include language that
establishes the payroll method, the Zimmerman approach, or even an altogether different method that better reflects the competing interests of small,
family-like businesses and a universally clear rule of non-discrimination. I
To enact the payroll method, Congress could amend Title VII's definition of
employer to read: "[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees on that person's payroll in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." This
language would require the courts to count both part-time and full-time
employees. To enact the Zimmerman approach Congress could amend Title
VII's definition of employer to read "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees who report to work or are
on paid leave for each working day of the work week in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks." This language would require courts to count employees only when those employees showed up to work or were on paid leave for
every day of the work week. Congress also could address latent ambiguities
in Title VII's statutory language that have not yet arisen, such as whether to
count part-time employees who work every day of the week but for only a
few hours each day. -' Second, the Supreme Court can resolve the impendMetropolitan case, see supra notes 164-204 and accompanying text.
251. EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Ripple, J., concurring), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996). Judge Ripple stated: "The
ambiguity of the present situation ought to be clarified. The scope of Title VII ought to be
the same in Boston and New Orleans as it is in Chicago." Id.
252. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (noting general absence, excepting
Senator Fannin's statement, of any discussion of part-time employees during legislative
debates regarding Title VII).
253. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (giving all federal legislative powers to Congress).
254. Congress seems to have intended to count part-time workers who work only a few
hours each day in light of the phrase "for each working day." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1994) (defining employer for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VI). If Congress did not
intend to count part-time workers who show up only a few days of the work week, Congress
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ing circuit split by granting certiorari to an appeal from a circuit court
decision. 5 The Supreme Court is capable of establishing a precedent for
counting employees for the purposes of Title VII jurisdiction. 2s6 This action
also will end the present circuit dispute and the present inequity of Title
VIl's current application to employees and small businesses.
Congress should resolve the dispute for two reasons. First, Congress
is better able to resolve the dispute. Congress can avoid paying attention to
the complicated debate that has developed among the courts. This dialectic
pits the payroll method's arguments of congressional intent against the Zimmerman approach's plain reading of the statute. There is no clear escape
from the debate, for both Title VII's legislative history and statutory language are very ambiguous. The statutory definition's ambiguity reflects
Congress's attempt to balance conflicting policy considerations. On one
hand, Congress chose to limit Title VII's coverage to businesses with a miniOn
mum number of employees in order to protect small family businesses.'
the other hand, Congress intended for rights to equal employment to be
widely available under the Act. 8 The chosen language reflects Congress's
inability to reconcile the inherent tensions between these two policies. The
Supreme Court would be required to decide the issue by examining Title
VII's vague statutory language and ambiguous legislative history. Therefore,
a judicial resolution would be imperfect. By contrast, Congress could resolve the issue by starting from a clean slate.
Second, Congress can craft a resolution based on contemporary policy
considerations. The Supreme Court is supposed to rule on disputes between
parties - not to decide public policy. 9 Whether and how to include parttime employees for purposes of Title VII jurisdiction are questions of public
probably did not intend to count part-time workers showing up every day of the work week.
See Takeall v. Werd, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 947, 948 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(deciding that part-time employees should not be counted for purposes of Title VII jurisdic-

tion when they show up only few days per week).
255. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 2 (granting appellate jurisdiction to Supreme
Court).
256. See id. § 1, cl. 2 (establishing Supreme Court as superior judicial power of United

States).
257. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,092 (1964) (noting Senator Cotton's concern that small
family businesses would be adversely affected by broad coverage of Title VII).
258. Id. at 13,087 (noting Senator Dirksen's concern that limiting coverage of Title VII
to only large businesses would undermine purpose of Act).
259. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1 (requiring that Supreme Court exercise

jurisdiction only to resolve cases or controversies). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. RlV. 1007 (1989) (analyzing problems with Supreme Court's use of public values to aid in statutory interpretation).
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policy, as neither the statute nor the legislative record provides a sufficient
basis upon which the underlying policy preferences of Congress can be discerned. 260 The next Congress could decide that it wants to preserve an
exemption from Title VII for small businesses that employ sizeable part-time
staffs, or it could decide it wants to expand the jurisdiction of Title VII.
Congress also can factor other public policy considerations into the final
decision, such as the ability of parties to document the work schedules of
part-time employees" and the ability of the EEOC to meet the responsibilities of expanded jurisdiction.262 Also, Congress may draw upon various
resources (such as agency and expert testimony before congressional committees) to decide public policy questions. In sum, Congress could deliver a
better resolution to the circuit split over whether to count part-time employees for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII.
B. An Argument for the Payroll Method
When the Supreme Court rules upon Darlene Walters's petition, it
should decide the case in favor of the payroll method for two reasons. First,
although the legislative history of Title VII does not discuss the appropriate
method for counting part-time workers,263 the legislative history lends greater
support to the view that Congress intended that all part-time workers be
counted. Senator Dirksen's statement that his amendment exempted seasonal
businesses from Title VII singled out only one form of part-time workers seasonal workers.' 4 Thus, Dirksen's statement is consistent with the view
that the statute covers other part-time workers. Senator Fannin's concern
that increasing Title VII's coverage would provide an incentive for businesses to fire their part-time staffs also supports the view that Congress
anticipated part-time employees being counted.'
Finally, the remedial
nature of Title VII supports the view that part-time employees should be
counted if they are on an employer's payroll.' 6
260. See supra part IIB-C (discussing ambiguity of Title VII's legislative history).
261. See EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 60 F.3d 1225, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995)
(conceding difficulty of maintaining records of hours worked by part-time employees), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
262. See 110 CONG. REc. 13,085 (1964) (arguing that federal government would be incapable of meeting jurisdictional responsibilities of Title VII if small businesses were covered).
263. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing absence of discussion of
counting part-time workers for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII).
264. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (analyzing debates surrounding Dirksen
amendment).
265. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (analyzing Fannin's statements against
expansion of Title VII's coverage).
266. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (stating that because Congress intended Title
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Second, the First and Fifth Circuits make more convincing arguments
on behalf of the payroll method than the Seventh and Eighth Circuits make
on behalf of the Zimmerman approach. Admittedly, the Seventh Circuit's
plain reading of the statutory language presents a cogent argument on behalf
of the Zimmerman approach. 7 But such analysis reads more into the
statutory language than the text itself requires, for Senator Dirksen intended
the language to exempt seasonal businesses, rather than all businesses.68
With respect to nonseasonal businesses, the payroll method is not inconsistent
with a plain reading of the statute's language. 69 Furthermore, the recent
Metropolitan decision responded poorly to criticisms of the Zimmerman
approach. The Metropolitanmajority repeatedly noted that circuit precedent
required the court of appeals to follow the Zimmerman approach.27 Judge
Ripple, in his concurrence, stated that the Zimmerman approach was not free
from doubt, but he voted with the majority because he felt obliged to follow
circuit precedent." Of course, the Supreme Court is not bound by a federal
court of appeals decision.- The Supreme Court will consider the question
before Congress does and should avoid engaging in an overly technical
analysis of legislative history and statutory language such that the original
congressional considerations of the statute fall to the side. Instead, the
Supreme Court should recognize that the payroll method better comports
with Congress's intent and should support its decision with the more persuasive arguments of the First and Fifth Circuits.

VII to remedy wrongs of past discrimination, Title VII's coverage should be construed
liberally).
267. See Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1983)
(arguing that words "for each working day" literally means that employee was at work for
each work day).
268. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (analyzing debates surrounding Dirksen
amendment).
269. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (citing EEOC's arguments that
payroll method can be read consistently with plain reading of Title VII's statutory language).
270. See EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1228 (noting that
stare decisis is of fundamental importance when considering question involving statutory construction (citing Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)).
271. Id. at 1230 (Ripple, J., concurring) (deciding that Zimmerman approach applied to
Title VII and that part-time employees are counted in weeks only when they worked every
day of given work week). Judge Ripple stated: "Although the correctness of Zimmerman
v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983), is not free from doubt, I must
conclude, with some reluctance, that the EEOC has not made a sufficiently strong case
to warrant our overruling established precedent of long standing." Id. (Ripple, J., concurring). For a discussion of the Metropolitan case, see supra notes 164-204 and accompanying
text.
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Conclusion

The current circuit split over the counting of part-time employees
to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of Title VII must be resolved.' z No
easy road to a resolution exists, however, if one takes the traditional avenue
of examining the meaning of statutory language. The statutory language of
Title VII does not indicate whether part-time employees should be counted, I
and the legislative history of the 1964 Act does not reveal whether Congress
intended for part-time employees to be counted. 274 Moreover, the debate
among the circuits has failed to produce a satisfactory analysis or resolution
of the counting question. 2 5 This question should not be answered by the
Supreme Court because the Court will not be able to find a solution that
reflects statutory construction or congressional intention, for Congress did
not consider the issue.276 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is about to
answer the question that Congress failed to consider thirty years ago.
The Supreme Court will decide whether Title VII jurisdiction over an
employer in the federal courts will be based on the employer having either
the requisite number of employees on the payroll or the requisite number of
employees at work for each working day. For employers, the question
seems properly framed. The question explores the parameters of Congress's
desire to protect small businesses. For plaintiffs like Darlene Walters, the
posture of the question seems foreign to their problems. Darlene Walters
wonders why, in order to address the merits of her sexual discrimination
complaint against her employer, federal courts must conduct an inquiry into
the number of days that she and her fellow employees worked during certain
work weeks. Individuals consider themselves to be employees of a business
simply if they work. To plaintiffs, the inquiry seems like an improper fuss
over whom and how to count.

272. See supra part IV.A (arguing for resolution of current circuit courts of appeals
split over counting of part-time employees for purposes of jurisdiction under Title VII).
273. See supra part I.A and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity of language of
Title Vil's definition of employer).
274. See supra part II.B-C (analyzing legislative history of Title VII and concluding that
Congress did not consider whether part-time employees were to be counted for purposes of
jurisdiction).
275. See supra part Ill (discussing and analyzing arguments between circuit courts of
appeals over whether or not to count part-time employees for purposes of jurisdiction under
Title VI).
276. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (arguing that Supreme Court will only
be able to craft imperfect resolution to part-time employee question).

